Chapter Seven Taxis, Violence and Leadership in Imizamo Yethu

In April 2015 a protest march took place against the proposed MyCiti Bus Rapid Transport (BRT) station at the northern entrance to Imizamo Yethu (Figure 7.1). Although not confronted by police, tempers rose and the protest culminated in the destruction of eight aluminium-framed temporary houses built close to the informal taxi rank. Given the long-standing demand for housing in the settlement, and the fact that the protest was around transport issues, the destruction of the temporary houses was initially confounding. However, on closer inspection it turns out that these issues were connected. According to the recently elected leader of the ANC-aligned faction of SANCO (hereafter SANCO 2015 leader), ‘the city could not explain why these few people had got housing ahead of others who have been waiting for years ... also why was MyCiti going where we had agreed there would be housing? This angered the community and we tore the temporary houses down’.

Figure 7.1. Remains of eight aluminium temporary houses destroyed in anti-BRT protest
In addition to confirming the centrality of the ‘battle of the green belt’ to politics in Imizamo Yethu, this incident draws attention to issues of transport, violence and leadership in the settlement. The main argument is that, similar to conflicts over housing outlined in the preceding Chapter, conflicts over transport in Imizamo Yethu are rooted in the contradictory logics of contending forms of governance. Unlike in relation to housing, market governance is important to understanding transport in Imizamo Yethu as the minibus taxi industry is a major means of mobility for most residents. However, both informal practices in the form of local sedans, and developmental governance in the form of the Bus Rapid Transport system of the City, are also key to these dynamics.

This Chapter demonstrates these tensions between forms on governance in the following ways. We show how the City attempted to license informal taxis in Imizamo Yethu in response to various externalities, in particular the use of violence by taxi owners and drivers to defend their livelihoods. We also how both informal and formal taxis, driven by market competition, exist in tension with public transport. In order to reduce the contradictions between market and developmental goals in the transport sector, the City of Cape Town is attempting to introduce a Bus Rapid Transport (BRT) system that includes formal taxi owners affected by the new bus routes as owners in the new BRT Company. In seeking to provide safer, more affordable and environmentally friendly transport to all residents of Cape Town, but on a for-profit basis, the BRT is a hybrid of developmental and market governance. As we shall see, however, while this public-private blend reduces tensions with most formal taxi owners, and thus the threat of violence and protest, it does not eliminate them altogether. Further, conflicts over transport produce legitimacy problems for leaders of Imizamo Yethu. This is because SANCO’s primary role is to mediate relations to the state, in particular to mediate forms of developmental governance, but as transport is governed through formal market and informal relations, there is little to no role for SANCO in this process. In short then, as informality and market relations increasingly dominate the supply of key needs such as transport to residents of Imizamo Yethu, SANCO, in any faction, becomes less relevant to the governance of daily life.

Lastly, despite being a settlement of substantial insecurity and violence, civil or political violence has been remarkably rare in Imizamo Yethu – at least until the aftermath of the fire of 2017 described in Chapter Six. This we take as a sign of the enduring legitimacy of the ANC’s right to rule in the settlement, which is at the heart of the ‘party society’ idea. At the same time however, disconnected from informal and market governance that shape how people get around, riven by factionalism and associated with corruption and nepotism, the community leaders aligned with the ANC are in a weaker position today than ever before. Thus, both increased violence in the taxi industry and decreasing legitimacy for community leaders are products of forms of
governance outside of City, and therefore democratic, control.

**Taxis and the ‘battle of the green belt’ in Imizamo Yethu**

By 2015, the ANC-aligned faction of SANCO had elected a new leader who was a key mover in the anti-BRT protest described above. We spoke to him a few months after the protest, and toured the site where the temporary houses lay destroyed. When asked why he did not take the bent aluminium frames for recycling, he replied, ‘no, no, no, we can’t do that, it belongs to the City’ (SANCO 2015). In rejecting the opportunity to recycle the aluminium frames destroyed in the anti-Bus Rapid Transport protest, the SANCO 2015 leader demonstrated a clear understanding of the difference between an action that is collective and politically motivated and one that is individual and economically self-interested. Thus, it is one thing for a community protest to destroy houses that, ironically, symbolise the long-standing failure of the state to deliver houses to the poor, but another for individuals to make personal profit out of this event.

That the protest against the BRT turnaround station was really an extension of the ‘battle of the green belt’ is confirmed not just by the SANCO 2015 leader, but also by Bristow’s (2015) research. At a public meeting on the proposed BRT turnaround in November 2014, attended by the MyCiti implementation department, the Housing Department, SANCO, and various taxi owners, the mood of the gathering was angry (Bristow 2015: 70). From the outset the debate centred on issues of housing, and especially the temporary housing, rather than the BRT. Key issues raised included: that moving eight families from the proposed site gave them unfair preference over others who had been waiting longer; that moving these eight shacks jeopardised formal construction by encouraging others to put up shacks; and that the new aluminium houses were not even being used by the families but were being rented out to foreigners. After 30 minutes, the meeting had descended into chaos and was disbanded. According to one participant:

> Since 1990 this area is called 16 hectares and was earmarked for development for the people. And then there was infighting by some of the people because they wanted to use the land for their own children. Then there was a court interdict and then it was removed. Now they say that they can start building houses there. They start developing for the bus instead of the houses. So we have questions again, why? Because they are now prioritising the bus that came yesterday and we don’t know because we have been here for years and the bus came yesterday they did not cater for us... (Bristow 2015: 70)

Another added, ‘we are looking to toyi-toyi, to burn tyres. But it is a secret. To chase MyCiti because they don’t talk to us’ (Bristow 2015: 67). A few months after the meeting the aluminium houses intended for those to be displaced by the new BRT turnaround station were trashed.
There is more to the story than this, as there is more to the SANCO 2015 leader than is first apparent. As well as being a community leader, the SANCO 2015 leader is also a taxi owner, and one of several in the Hout Bay Cape Town (HBCT) Association that has not been included in the City of Cape Town’s Bus Rapid Transport (BRT) buy-out scheme for taxi owners. Consequently, his business is under direct threat from the MyCiti buses scheduled to operate on the Wynberg Route that runs on Hout Bay Road past Imizamo Yethu. This opens the possibility that despite its communal camouflage, the anti-BRT protest was really driven by the business interests of an entrepreneur. Ironically, this is precisely the moral distinction between the communal, political and legitimate, and personal, economic and illegitimate identified above by the very same SANCO 2015 leader.

However, this conclusion is premature and partial for several reasons. First, there is the long-standing history of struggle over the development vision for Imizamo Yethu, especially over the 16 hectares that lie along Hout Bay Road at the lowest edge of the settlement. Thus even if the SANCO 2015 leader has a personal interest in delaying the BRT on the Wynberg route, it coincides with a longstanding collective demand for housing on the BRT land. In this sense it constitutes a classic instance of von Holdt’s ‘dual nature of protest’ where elite interests and popular insurgency combine in one event (von Holdt & Alexander 2012: 104). Second, the advent of the BRT threatens the livelihoods of at least some taxi operators on the Wynberg route who have a case that their exclusion is unjust – and again framed in terms of racial exclusion. To understand this better it is helpful to know the history of formal taxis in Hout Bay.

**Formal Taxis, the BRT and Economic Exclusion**

Hout Bay is connected to the rest of Cape Town by three roads, one of which is the Chapman’s Peak toll road that leads south to the Cape peninsula. As discussed in the subsequent Chapter, this is an expensive toll road and few people commute south for work, so most traffic flows either along the Atlantic seaboard to the city centre or through the leafy green suburb of Constantia to Wynberg. The rapid growth of the population of Hout Bay in the last twenty years, and especially Imizamo Yethu, has created a significant need for public transport as the vast majority of poor residents do not own cars.

Research by the Sustainable Livelihoods Foundation (2015) found that by 2013 this need for transport had yielded four different taxi industries (see Figure 7.2). Two of these are formal, involving over 65 mini-bus taxis registered with CATA (Cape Amalgamated Taxi Association) travelling on the Hout Bay to Wynberg route, and over 200 CUTA (Cape United Taxi Association) taxis using the Hout Bay to City Centre route on the Atlantic seaboard. In addition,
two informal taxi groupings transport residents from Imizamo Yethu around Hout Bay. These are colloquially known as the ‘amaphela’ (cockroaches), and in 2013 in the process of being formalised into the Hout Bay to Cape Town (HBCT) Association, as well as the ‘amahoender’ (chickens), at that time not formalised. Where most residents of Imizamo Yethu use formal taxis to travel to work or further afield, the informal taxis are used mostly to go to the local shops, and are especially popular when carrying a load of groceries up the steep slopes of Imizamo Yethu.

As also illustrated by Figure 7.2 the implicit business model of taxis is low profit per fare, but high volume of fares, with the taxi driver first meeting daily targets and then earning their own wage. In addition to incentivising the transport of large volumes of passengers, this model also transfers much of the risk associated with petrol price increases onto the driver first. The taxi industry is thus not just competitive, but this competition most keenly affects drivers whose livelihoods depend on moving large numbers of people quickly (Taxi drivers 2013).
Figure 7.2. Taxi routes, Hout Bay, Cape Town
Informal taxis, known as ‘amaphela’ (meaning ‘cockroach’) and ‘amahoender’ (meaning ‘chicken’) provide short-distance transport services. Informal taxis provide workers with transport from Imizamo Yethu to their work destinations in Hout Bay and Llandudno. They also provide the township residents with access to Hout Bay shopping malls, the clinic and other facilities. The majority of the informal taxi drivers live in Imizamo Yethu, and the transport service is predominantly owner operated.

**Figure 7.3.** Local routes
In this regard, it is critical to note that the taxi industry mushroomed in the late 1980s in response to deregulation but routes quickly became over-saturated, and competition for customers degenerated into incidents of conflict (McCaul 1990; Barret 2003). Largely unregulated, taxi operators resorted to violence to defend and secure their livelihoods, exacerbated by corrupt relations with officials and the rise of mafia-like ‘mother bodies’ (Dugard 2001). This conflict led to the tightening of regulations on taxis, including the issuing of licenses for specific associations on specific routes to manage conflict. Thus, individual taxi owners would apply to join an association that enjoyed exclusive rights to a route. In Hout Bay CUTA has the rights to the Hout Bay to City Centre route, and CATA the rights to the Hout Bay to Wynberg route.

This model of reducing open competition to reduce violence has informed the taxi industry up to the present. As we shall see below, a similar logic was evident in our experience of informal taxis in Imizamo Yethu, as competition over the right to operate on crowded routes descended in violent attacks. This provoked a similar response from the state to formalise these through licensing to provide a degree of livelihoods security. Thus, as with housing policy that attempts to reduce the health, fire and safety costs of informal settlement, formalisation of taxis attempts to reduce the externalities (violence, safety, bad driving) of informal market relations.

At the time of the BRT protest in 2015, tensions between the formal associations along the two main routes remained. There are two main reasons for this. First, was the allocation of the Hout Bay to City Centre route to CUTA, most of whose owners were not from Hout Bay, and which marginalised the CATA-aligned HBCT Association, most of whom were from Imizamo Yethu. Notably, these CATA owners had to register at the Wynberg taxi rank, as Imizamo Yethu did not have its own taxi association in 2013. Second, was the introduction of the Bus Rapid Transport (BRT) system to Hout Bay that does not recognise CATA rights to the Atlantic route, and threatens many in the taxi industry that have existing rights. This is because full compensation for routes lost by taxi operators and shares in the new BRT Company go to those whose entire route is supplanted by the BRT. This does not apply to many taxi owners in Hout Bay, and partially affected owners get only partial compensation and no shares.

*Competition over routes* In respect of the first issue, CATA-aligned taxis operators claimed to be the original group who started the Hout Bay to Cape Town route along the Atlantic seaboard; their rights to use the route were, however, not formalised. Indeed, as one respondent observed, ‘Imizamo Yethu is the only township without a taxi association’ (Taxi owner FG 2012). In the absence of a formalised presence and rights to the route, competition from CUTA-aligned taxis quickly emerged. According to one respondent (quoted in Bristow 2015: 69):
It was a fight between us and CUTA. We told them that they could not operate that route and that it was ours. But to be honest we did not have mini-busses just the sedans. ... So we had this fight and the traffic cops came here and operated for a week impounding our vehicles. So then we decided that we must do this right.

While the CATA taxi drivers decided to withdraw from operating, the CUTA owners managed to be the first to secure licenses for the route. How exactly they managed to do this is a matter of contention. According to the licensing authority, the Provincial Regulatory Unit (PRE), CUTA registered in 2003 and applied for rights shortly thereafter. Notably, they add that ‘the PRE does not necessarily determine which association to be registered when and where but rather we receive applications from associations. These applications will then be referred to the Planning Authority in the area where the association is intended to provide the service’ (Bristow 2015: 70). In short, although formally a matter for the province to approve, someone in the City of Cape Town affirmed the right of CUTA to the lucrative Atlantic route. Whatever exactly happened in this matter remains mysterious, but the incident is a good example of both the limited power of the City in the context of co-operative governance in South Africa, and the added complexity this lends to bureaucratic governance by the state.

The CATA-aligned taxis, now renamed the Hout Bay Cape Town (HBCT) Association, began contesting CUTA rights to the Atlantic seaboard route in 2004. According to Bristow (2015: 68), one document from the City of Cape Town states that, contrary to the PRE decision, CATA’s claim to the Atlantic seaboard route was supported by the City. She notes, ‘officials from the South Peninsula Traffic Department had visited Imizamo Yethu and established that there was a need for transportation from the informal settlement to Cape Town via Camps Bay’. However, the Association could not operate until their licence had been approved, and as the Public Protector Report notes (Bristow 2015), while the HBCT Association was waiting for the licensing documentation to be approved, CUTA started to operate on the same route. Following the use of the courts, the HBCT eventually managed to register with the PRE in December 2012, but by this point events had been overtaken by the BRT process.

*The rise of the bus* The introduction of the Bus Rapid Transport (BRT) system has had a profound impact on the taxi industry in Hout Bay. Informed by the revolutionary public transport system developed in Bogota, Columbia, the BRT was conceived as a key part of an integrated public transport network to improve upon the existing public transport in the build-up to the 2010 Soccer World Cup. Confronted by the spatial legacy of apartheid where poor, black residents still live a long way from work, the BRT attempts to address this by making transport more affordable, but also safer, more environmentally friendly, and accessible to the disabled
and elderly. It thus pursues clear developmental ends. At the same time, the key business feature of the BRT is to buy out taxi owners by incorporating those with licenses into vehicle operating companies that would be contracted by the City of Cape Town to run the MyCiti buses for 12 years. The key idea was to give taxi owners a vested interest in the BRT and so promote cooperation rather than conflict. By and large this approach appears to have worked. Indeed, according to a City councillor, the Hout Bay route is ‘the top performing route or the second performing route’ (Bristow 2015: 70). In general however, the BRT makes a loss. In 2016, the MyCiti busses in Cape Town recovered just 49% of their operating costs from fare revenues (Van Rensburg 2017).

However, in Hout Bay, three issues remain with the introduction of the BRT. The first is that CUTA was bought out along the Atlantic route by the BRT process and not CATA, despite CATA’s reasonable claims to have rights to this route. This issue continues to irk the CATA-aligned taxi owners. Their anger is evident in the comments of one taxi driver who stated ‘Those buses! One of these days, they force and put people in them, we will burn those busses if we have to and will go to jail if we have to. We will fight the City of Cape Town down to the wire (Bristow 2015: 67).

The second issue is that not all taxi owners working the Hout Bay to Cape Town route were included in the new deal as they were only partially affected by the BRT. Further, a number of taxi drivers summarily lost their jobs as their owners sold bought into the BRT without informing them. As a consequence a rump of CUTA taxi owners continued to operate illegally in Hout Bay, using an informal taxi rank near the police station for their activities (Bristow 2015: 54; Taxi owners 2012). As one driver put it:

   We are on our own fight to get permits. We came here at a very young age; we were all gaartjies (conductors) before we became drivers. Now all of a sudden the owners are turning their permits in. Without even letting us know. We all had dreams of owning our own taxis one day. They are turning their permits in and they are closing our route. So it is bad for us.

Lastly, although the MyCiti busses were not yet running on the Hout Bay to Wynberg route in 2012-3, several taxi owners who work that route were deeply concerned about the threat to their business posed by the new busses (Taxi owners 2012). Excluded from the Atlantic route deal, and witnessing the marginalisation of partially affected CATA operators, CATA taxi owners are loath to trust the city. This distrust has deep roots linked to contests over local leadership, party loyalty, and accessing the City.
Informal Taxis and ‘party-society’ in Imizamo Yethu

Clearly, the taxi industry in Hout Bay is very competitive, but this competition is manifest most sharply for drivers whose livelihoods depend on moving large numbers of people quickly. The intensity of this competition, including among the informal ‘amaphela’ and ‘amahoender’, was manifest on our first day of fieldwork in Imizamo Yethu in 2011. On entering the settlement we found the main road blocked near the informal taxi rank, and saw at least five vehicles damaged from rocks thrown at them. At the Hout Bay police station we met an ‘amahoender’ taxi driver reporting this attack who complained that rival ‘amaphela’ taxi drivers damaged his car. These incidents were the culmination of several days of conflict that reportedly saw one person wounded in a shooting incident (Isaacs 2011).

From engaging with taxi drivers on both sides of the conflict and in both factions of SANCO, we were able to establish that the conflict centred on the attempt to formalise the local taxi industry into what later would become the Hout Bay Cape Town (HBCT) Association affiliated to CATA. The issue was the limited number of licenses promised by the City that made the ‘amaphela’ reluctant to admit new members. Driven by the necessity of earning a livelihood, many (about 20) were not accommodated in the ‘amaphela’ (about 80), but decided to drive anyway. These renegades were called the ‘amahoender’ (SANCO 2007, 2012; Taxi owners 2012).

This issue continued to simmer over the next couple of years until the HBCT Association agreed to include most of the ‘amahoender’ in their ranks, thereby defusing the conflict. Notably, in the early days local leaders articulated a variety of causes of the conflict. Amongst these were the views of some local leaders that the 2007 faction of SANCO was using this to destabilise Imizamo Yethu and therefore delegitimise the ‘new’ ANC-aligned faction. Another was that the DA government was using the violence to discredit taxis, so as to bring in the BRT system (Taxi owners 2012). While in retrospect these theories seem somewhat unlikely, they do confirm the centrality of race, party and the relation to the local state as central to conceptions of politics in Imizamo Yethu.

Hopefully, it is now clear how issues related to taxi violence (the BRT protest and amahoender vs. amaphela conflict), reflect the long history of partisan conflict over the development of Imizamo Yethu. Key to this are not just divergent visions for Imizamo Yethu, but also partisan visions of how state and society should relate in this process. Thus, the ANC and its allies at local level advance a conception of state-society relations that we term ‘party-society’ politics
(Piper 2015; Piper & Anciano 2015). Central here is the idea of ANC dominance of the state, at least until recently, giving rise to the idea of a ‘party-state’ akin practically to a one-party or dominant party system (Giliomee & Simkins 1999; Brooks 2004; Butler 2009). We suggest that a similar relationship between the ANC and civil society exists in the mind of most party activists.

The attempt to constitute ‘party-society’ applies at both national and local level. Thus the ANC is, or at least was, able to extend its authority over civil society by forming the tripartite alliance with the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and South African Community Party (SACP). This occurs informally at local or community level through a combination of ideology and patronage politics (Piper 2015; Piper & Anciano 2015). On the one hand the ANC’s liberation nationalism includes a ‘bounded pluralism’ that practically affirms the black oppressed as at the heart of the nation, and a conception of leadership that exclusively constructs the ANC as the only legitimate representative of this implicitly racialised nation. On the other hand, access to the ANC-run local state is best secured through informal networks in the party and its allies, such as SANCO, rather than through formal channels or invited spaces of participatory governance (Bénit-Gbaffou 2011).

In Imizamo Yethu the power of the idea of ‘party-society’ as the champions of the settlement is evident in the discourse of local leaders. Interviewed in 2015, a SANCO leader stated, ‘We as ... I believe the ANC, people to fight to get this piece of land we were holding the ANC flag from these five informal settlements ...’ (Sikota 2015: 65). Also important is the way that SANCO explicitly identifies with the ANC and campaigns for it at election time. Critically, the justification for the ANC is always linked to notions of race and the exclusion of residents of Imizamo Yethu from Hout Bay. A good example is from a focus group with ANC members (ANC voters 2015):

... I used to hear about Hout Bay while I was still in the Eastern Cape and I came here finally and worked as a domestic worker. We used to get arrested here for just being black. We couldn’t even build our shacks. What you see now here you would never find during the times of apartheid. We used to stay in the bushes covering ourselves with shelters made of plastic during the night and hiding them away during the day when we went to work so that the police could not see that there people living there.

The first time I got arrested I was pregnant with my first child. That’s the kind of life we lived and by that time Tata Mandela was behind bars, busy fighting for us and he never gave in to the demands and bribes of white people. During this time people were dying and some of us got badly injured. But finally he got out and we won.
Coming to your question, and looking at how much we suffered to get here, I was not expecting to see anyone especially here in Hout Bay where we fought so hard. I was not expecting to hear people saying ‘I belong to DA’ or ‘I belong to Agang’ or EFF for that matter. What I was expecting is that we would unite and speak with one voice because we know where we come from. Some comrades died fighting for us. So in a place as small as Imizamo Yethu I was not expecting anyone to be belonging to any other party, it is exactly like selling each other out!

In addition to the influence of racial ideas on ANC legitimacy, in Imizamo Yethu the logic of the ‘party-society’ is reproduced instrumentally by developmental governance that requires representatives from communities ‘below’ or smaller than the ward for various development projects such as housing, schools and clinics. Thus, while the formal political system does not recognise representation below the ward level, developmental governance often requires it at the level of place, offering a space for the ‘party-society’ to reproduce itself. In the previous Chapter, we demonstrated how SANCO was able to do this at the expense of Sinethemba through the governance opportunities provided by various housing projects. This point was made many times by an important SANCO leader who said, ‘all I want is development for Imizamo Yethu’ (Community leader 2 2015). It is most evident in the fact that the conflict between the two factions of SANCO plays out in terms of who speaks for Imizamo Yethu in development projects from Niall Mellon housing, to the Disa School, to the new clinic and the new security patrols.

While developmental governance is the focus of the representational ambitions of the SANCO factions, these groupings also play an intermediary role between local residents and important aspects of bureaucratic governance too. Thus while SANCO is not necessarily the first port of call for residents when dealing with issues managed by the line departments of the city such as roads, sanitation, electricity and the like – residents can access the local state directly on these issues – local leaders are mediators for access to bureaucracy in at least three other ways.

First, a key leader in this network is one of two Community Development Workers (CDW) for Hout Bay whose job it is to help citizens access state services. Very important here is the role of the CDW in facilitating access to short-term state jobs through the Extended Public Works Programme (EPWP) and the like. Second, the ANC is key in respect of authenticating someone as a resident of Imizamo Yethu, a requirement for bank accounts, cell-phone contracts and the like. This residential requirement poses a challenge for residents who do not receive accounts via the mail or, as in the case of informal settlements, have no formal address. As was confirmed by multiple observations, most institutions in Hout Bay, including for example the local Standard
Bank, accept proof of residence in Imizamo Yethu on a state form with an ANC stamp on it.

Third, before it was burnt down, all of these functions were administered out of the ANC offices in Imizamo Yethu that also contained the only photocopier available to the public in the settlement. Symbolically and practically, then, the ANC-aligned leadership network in Imizamo Yethu has succeeded in making itself a critical intermediary for residents, especially poorer residents, looking to access both developmental and bureaucratic governance in Hout Bay. Indeed, an ANC leader boasted of how a former party youth leader who tried to leave the ANC and run a non-partisan development effort soon returned to the party-fold once he was ‘cut off from things’ (Community leader 2 2015).

Lastly though, as noted in the previous Chapter, there is a severe limitation to the practice of ‘party-society’ politics in Imizamo Yethu, namely the fact that, since 2006, the City of Cape Town has been governed by the ANC’s largest opponent, the Democratic Alliance (DA). Further, the City (and the Province since 2009), embraces a vision for state-society relations that differs radically from the ANC and SANCO. In contrast to the ANC’s racialised nationalism that legitimates its exclusive right to rule, the DA affirms plural conceptions of community and a liberal contest for office that nevertheless allows it to claim state development projects as party achievements (Piper 2015; Anciano 2016). Thus, where SANCO sees DA rule as inherently illegitimate, the DA sees SANCO’s representation as inherently suspect. These differences have created a dilemma for SANCO leaders in Imizamo Yethu between loyalty to the ANC and its discourse of racialised liberation nationalism versus embracing the non-partisan, all-inclusive model of community representation preferred by the DA-run City (Piper & Bénit-Gbaffou 2014).

In this context, a set of SANCO leaders emerged in 2007 who chose to participate heavily in the forums of local governance in Hout Bay, embracing the ‘non-partisan’ model of community representation advocated by the DA controlled city. In the words of their leader ‘we are committed to development ... we are not like the other SANCO who only want money from houses and do nothing ... they call us headless chickens because we don’t chase money (SANCO 2007, 2012). By 2011, ANC leadership, concerned by the perceived co-option of the 2007 SANCO by the state represented in choosing the school over housing as outlined in the preceding Chapter, endorsed a rival group. The leadership rivalry between two factions of SANCO in Imizamo Yethu is widely observed in Hout Bay, and one reason why SANCOs’ standing has declined over the last ten years. Another, noted in the previous Chapter, is the widespread perception of corruption and/or nepotism in the access to housing lists alleged against both sets of leaders. A third reason, identified in this Chapter is the increasing irrelevance of a leadership defined by its gatekeeping role in developmental and bureaucratic governance in a community where a huge proportion of residents live by market and informal means.
Informal Taxis, Violence and ‘slow activism’

The conflict between the ‘amahoender’ and ‘amaphela’ in 2011 draws our focus not just to informality and leadership in Imizamo Yethu, but to violence too. It is clear that Imizamo Yethu is a violent place and most people live with high levels of insecurity. Police statistics for Hout Bay indicate an average of 13 deaths per year for the last five years (SAPS 2015). This amounts to a figure of 26 per 100,000, which, while lower than the national average of 33 per 100,000, is still high. Further research also suggests that many crimes, particularly those related to sexual violence, mugging and robbery, are significantly under reported (Piper & Wheeler 2016). Perhaps more striking has been the rise in drug-related crime, which has seen a notable spike in the last few years.

In participatory workshops run in Imizamo Yethu in 2011, all discussions highlighted the question of insecurity. As Piper and Wheeler (2016: 35) note, almost all groups of residents fear crime, ‘especially at night, and in all parts of the settlement other than in the section where they lived’. While respondents felt that ‘the police, SANCO/ANC and the community’ should be the leading actors in reducing crime, in that order, they reported that those who made the community safe were ‘cats and dogs, neighbours and family’, in that order. Cats, because they ‘kill rats and mice that eat food’, and dogs because ‘they bark at tsotsis’ (Piper & Wheeler 2016: 36).

By contrast, until the vigilante killing of gang leaders in 2015, we had not heard of any civic violence-related deaths in the last ten years. Of course, there has been violence directed against property, for example, the aluminium-framed shacks destroyed in the BRT protest or the damage to the cars of the ‘amahoender’ taxi drivers. In the previous Chapter we also noted the two moments of xenophobic mobilisation in 2008 and 2009, and the burning of the ANC office and ANC-aligned leaders’ houses in 2017. All things considered, however, the extent and nature of civic violence in Imizamo Yethu has been low compared to most townships in an era of unprecedented popular protest that ranks amongst the highest in the world (Alexander 2010).

This comparative lack of civic violence is important, firstly, because as Piper and Wheeler (2016) point out, it runs against common conceptions that political competition for office is the primary source of violence, and suggests that violence is not the basis of local authority in
Imizamo Yethu. Hence, the deep, enduring and public differences between the two factions of SANCO have very infrequently manifest in violent conflict; rather appeal has been made to the higher structures of SANCO (Community leader 2 2015; SANCO 2007 2012). Until recently, that is. As noted in the preceding Chapter, following the fire of March 2017, new levels of civic violence became evident in Imizamo Yethu with the burning down of the ANC office and the houses of the Community Development Worker and two ANC leaders.

Propagated by residents of the informal settlement in Donske Yakhe, this violence mirrors the violence of the informal taxi conflict of 2011, and alerts us to the disconnect between SANCO leaders, consciously positioned as gatekeepers of developmental governance, and the growing numbers of informal settlers and informal livelihoods in Imizamo Yethu that look to avoid the gaze of the state. In both these cases violence erupted when the logics of formality and informality collided, rather than in the competition over access to developmental governance. What this new level of violence also reflects is the declining legitimacy of either faction of SANCO to represent significant portions of Imizamo Yethu who are unable or unwilling to access developmental governance. The logic of the ‘party-society’ only applies to those who can, or want, to access the state.

In sum then, factionalism, allegations of corruption, and the growth of informality have all weakened SANCO in Imizamo Yethu. Today both factions of SANCO struggle to mobilise more than a few hundred people in a settlement of well over 20,000. Despite this, it is still strong enough to remain the most legitimate civil society formation in Imizamo Yethu through its association with the ANC and its mediatory role with the state and donors. Importantly, the increasing weakness of SANCO does not necessarily imply a decline in popularity for the ANC, as the standing of the former is linked to the importance of developmental governance for residents of Imizamo Yethu, and this is on the decline with the rise of both the market and informality. Conversely, the ANC is an organisation associated with overt politics such as voting and public debate, activities that are episodic rather than every day for most residents.

All of this implies that, contrary to the decline of SANCO over the last decade, the ANC could remain a powerful contender with the DA in electoral terms. Key here is the promise of the ANC to undo the racial segregation, economic exclusion, and political marginality experienced by residents of Imizamo Yethu on a daily basis, and produced by the contending logics of market, developmental and informal governance in Hout Bay. Given the enduring and new segregation that has transpired in Hout Bay since 1994, and its overlay with socio-economic and racial differences, it is not hard to see how the link of race to party works for the ANC. Indeed, the same is true for the DA at the local level of Hout Bay. In effect then, electoral competition in a context of neo-apartheid segregation may well reinforce rather than challenge social divides.
Conclusion

In addition to affirming the racialised ‘battle of the green belt’ as central to the politics of Imizamo Yethu, the anti-BRT protest draws attention to the conflicts over transport, and in particular the formalisation of the taxi industry and its relationship with the Bus Rapid Transport (BRT) system. Key to these conflicts are issues of livelihoods, and how the struggle to survive informal market competition around transport leads to violence, prompting the state to formalise the industry to save lives, reduce conflict, and improve safety.

Furthermore, in an attempt to achieve developmental goals such as safe, affordable and environmentally sustainable transport, and to avoid further protest and violence, the state has pursued the BRT idea by including taxi owners in the new dispensation through a co-ownership model. In this way market and developmental governance are blended into a public-private partnership to achieve developmental ends, rather than simply introducing a publicly-run bus transport system that would generate conflict with private taxis. In effect, then, informality and market governance have shrunk the space for the developmental governance of transport in Imizamo Yethu through the threat of violence.

This shrunken space for the developmental governance of transport, and its relationship to violence, offers insight into the declining role of SANCO leadership in Imizamo Yethu. In the spirit of party-society politics that ideologically melds state, ANC and blackness, and practically monopolises the gateway to the state, SANCO has hitched its legitimacy to developmental governance. However, as more and more residents rely either on informal or market governance to meet their daily needs, SANCO’s role becomes less and less relevant. Hence, SANCO’s inability to speak for the residents of Dontse Yakhe after the fire and its marginality to struggles over taxis and busses in Hout Bay. Indeed, the decline of SANCO is manifest in the lack of violence in the contest for community leadership of Imizamo Yethu. While factionalism and a perception of corruption also taint community leadership, its declining ability to influence key forms of governance helps to explain its waning status.

References


**Interviews**


